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Abstract 
This paper estimates the impact of entries and mergers on the price of mobile voice services 
in a panel database of 27 European Member States between 2003 and 2010. Our difference-
in-differences econometric methodology exploits the variance in different structural changes 
between countries to separate the respective effects. Our results show that the effect of entry 
crucially depends on the number of active operators and the type of entrant, and not 
controlling for these differences might lead to misleading conclusions. We find no robust 
evidence that entry has a price-decreasing effect on markets with originally 2 operators. 
However, the entry of a 4th operator does have a price-decreasing effect, but with different 
dynamics concerning the entrant's type. When we separate entry effects for the subsequent 
years, we show that the significant price-decreasing effects for local operators entering occur 
only in the first year after entry, while the price-decreasing effects for multinational entries 
are significantly larger on the long-run. Last, we find no price-increasing effects of 5-to-4 
mergers, but a long run price-increasing effect of a 4-to-3 merger. 
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1. Introduction 
In mobile telecommunications markets of European Member States, we see a vast number of 
entries between 2000 and 2010, and also a large decrease (more than 50%) in the price of 
voice services. But are these price changes driven by entry or are they due to other influencing 
factors? Answering this question is of crucial importance for regulatory policies in these 
markets, because mechanically associating entry with falling prices could lead to excessive 
policy steps towards incentivizing entry (for example, concerning spectrum allocation, and 
asymmetric regulation of termination charges favoring new operators), sometimes resulting in 
non-sustainable market structures. On the other hand, we also observe a tendency of 
consolidation in the mobile industry in the form of mergers and joint ventures, and so 
competition policy faces the opposite question whether the decrease in the number of mobile 
operators would lead to an increase of prices. At the end, all of the European mergers in this 
period were cleared (although some of them only with remedies), and so we can evaluate 
whether they have been indeed beneficial or at least neutral to the competitive process. 
Our paper aims to evaluate the ex-post effects of entries and mergers on the prices of mobile 
voice services by using a database of 27 European Member States between 2003 and 2010. 
Our results show that the effect of entries and mergers crucially depends on the number of 
active operators and the type of entrant, and not controlling for these differences might lead to 
misleading conclusions. Our panel database allows us to follow markets affected by changes 
in market structure, and compare the post-entry (or post-merger) outcomes both to pre-entry 
outcomes in the same market and to market trends in other markets not affected by entry. As 
we can find a different set of treatment and control groups for each separate entry or merger 
effect we want to estimate, almost all of parameters of interest can be identified. This classical 
difference-in-differences estimation method also minimizes the risk resulting from 
unobserved heterogeneity between markets. 
Although prices are not the only indicators of the intensity of competition and for the welfare 
of consumers, they are of central importance both from a theoretical and policy point of view. 
Many regulatory policies are based on a comparison of prices between European countries,
4
 
but these simple cross-sectional analyses can lead to misleading conclusions because of at 
least two reasons. First, the price difference between countries of n and (n + 1) active mobile 
operators can be due to other factors, and the analyst can never be sure of having solved the 
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omitted variable bias problem. Second and more importantly, the effect of an additional 
operator estimated from a cross-sectional comparison cannot be equated with the effect of an 
actual entry that might have a long-lasting effect on a single market.  
Summarizing the experience of entries and mergers between 2003 and 2010 can be also useful 
because this period coincides with the widespread launch of third generation mobile services 
and also with the allocation of the corresponding new radio spectrum bands in the early 
2000s. As the launch of fourth-generation (4G) mobile services is currently under way, new 
spectrum needs to be allocated,
5
 so a thorough understanding of the ex-post effects would 
allow more informed future policy decisions, and more realistic expectations about the effect 
of entry on mobile markets. Therefore, we are testing four hypotheses that can provide 
empirical evidence to fine-tune traditional rules of thumb on entry and merger issues in 
mobile telecommunication markets. 
First, we examine whether the effect of entry depends on the number of mobile operators 
originally active on the respective markets. Our results show that only the effect of an 
operator entering markets with originally 3 or 4 operators turns out to be significant for most 
specifications.
6
 Although this result alone cannot lead to a general conclusion that the optimal 
number of mobile operators is 3 or 4, we observe that after several entries and mergers, all 27 
European Member States but Cyprus ended up with 3 or 4 active operators by 2012. 
Second, we test whether the type of entrant matters for entry effects, partly because of their 
potentially different competitive impact, and also because regulatory policies are sometimes 
biased towards or against the entry of multinational or local operators. This separation 
becomes especially important for markets with originally 3 operators, and so our results show 
that the effectivity of entry depends not only on the initial number of firms but also on the 
type of the entrant, which should be taken into account both for ex-ante planning and ex-post 
assessment. 
Third, we examine the dynamics of entry effects and therefore separate the effect of entry on 
the first, second and subsequent years after it occurred. This separation highlights further 
important differences. Entries on the markets with originally 2 operators are still mostly 
insignificant, but the point estimates indicate that local 3rd entrants might have a larger 
beneficial impact. The entry of a 4th local entrant has a price-decreasing effect only in the 
first year, but no effect afterwards. Conversely, the entry of a multinational firm to the 4th 
position (these types of entries always correspond to Hutchison) does not affect prices in the 
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first year, but then decreases prices (although statistically non-significantly) from the second 
year onwards. We can however find a statistically significant difference in the price effects 
brought by the types of entrants: in the first year after entry, local entrants have a more 
beneficial (negative) effect on prices than multinational firms, and the reverse is true from the 
third year onwards. These findings indicate that although local entrants might have been 
associated with more aggressive price strategies, their entry does not lead to a long-run 
competitive impact on 3-to-4-firm markets. 
The table below summarizes the dynamics of average price effects for different entry types 
based on the estimation results of our final econometric specification.
7
 Note that these effects 
are not cumulative over time and they always refer to the price difference in the specific year 
between countries affected by a specific type of entry and otherwise similar countries but for 
that entry (this is done by controlling for other country-specific properties).  
 
Table 1. Estimated average price effects (point estimates) for different entry types 
 2-to-3 entry  3-to-4 entry 
Multinational Local Multinational Local 
In 1st year +8% -33% +2% -31%*** 
In 2nd year +28%** -24% -20% -10% 
From 3rd year +3% -15% -21% +26% 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
Fourth, we evaluate the effect of mergers depending on whether they occurred in 5- or 4-
player markets. For the only 4-to-3 merger (in Denmark) cleared with remedies, we find no 
significant price changes in the first and second year after the merger, but a significant price 
increase (+29%) can be shown from the third year, compared to the trend of similar 4-
operator countries. For 5-to-4 mergers, we no price-increasing effects are found after the 
merger or in the subsequent years. Based on these results, we can also refute the hypothesis 
that the effects of x-to-y entries and y-to-x mergers are similar in magnitude with an opposite 
sign, which simplified idea is sometimes present in competition policy analyses. 
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2. Literature review  
Our impact assessment method based on difference-in-differences estimation fits into the 
broad class of "program evaluation" or "treatment effect" literature, discussed 
comprehensively by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). However, while this method is very 
common in labor economics for example, there are substantially lower number of applications 
in Industrial Organization.
8
 
Recently, ex-post evaluation studies of mergers have become more common, partly because 
competition authorities felt the need to quantify the welfare benefits of their activity.
9
 Most 
ex-post studies using a treatment effect approach compare local markets in a given country 
affected by a merger to other non-affected local markets.
10
 In the telecommunication industry, 
however, the formation of treatment and control groups would usually not be possible within 
a country, so the analysis must be built on inter-country comparisons. 
The use of country-level panel data is relatively scarce for studying the change in market 
structure.
11
 Li and Lyons (2012) study the speed of market penetration of mobile telephone 
services for a large panel of OECD countries in 1991-2006 and find that an increase in the 
number of mobile operators significantly improves the diffusion rate till the entry of the fifth 
player (although the entry of the 4th player is shown to be insignificant). The subject of our 
paper is on mobile pricing and for a different time period, so it is of no surprise that our 
results provide different indications for the optimal number of operators. 
Gruber (2005, 2007) builds a simple analytical framework for studying entry into the mobile 
telecommunication industry and examines developments on European markets from this 
perspective. One of Gruber's main conclusions is that regulators just mechanically applied an 
"n + 1 rule" meaning that there should be one more active operator with the introduction of a 
new technology generation and the corresponding spectrum released (3G in 2000s) in order to 
guarantee effective competition. However, he presents convincing evidence that this 
hypothesis was not well founded and was based much more on industry policy objectives than 
demand-side considerations. Operators also overestimated the profitability of entry and often 
entered if a possibility arose. Garrard (1998) also finds similar evidence for mobile market 
developments till 1997. These findings are important for our empirical analysis, as they 
indicate that entries could plausibly be considered exogenous shocks. 
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3. Developments on European mobile telecommunication markets between 2000 and 2012 
At the very beginning of the 2000s the widespread expectation was that the third generation 
mobile services capable of providing fast data transmission in addition to voice services 
would be an imminent success story for mobile markets. Though the technology, services and 
business models were not ready and tested, these inflated expectations influenced the timing 
of spectrum assignments in Western Europe. The allocation process started in 1999 and many 
countries started releasing the 3G spectrum as soon as possible. Some countries chose 
auctions as allocation method while others used beauty contests. Early auctions in 2000 
resulted in lot of new applicants and extremely high bids for the spectrum, and therefore 
unexpectedly high revenues to the state budgets. 
This environment also encouraged regulators in many countries to set the allocation 
procedures in a way that offered entry opportunities for newcomers to the increasingly mature 
mobile markets. By the beginning of the 2000s we observe 3 or 4 active operators on the 
mobile markets of most developed countries. This was a result of a gradual increase in the 
number of operators from the analogue mobile service era. There were always entry 
opportunities whenever a new spectrum band was released.  The 900 MHz spectrum for GSM 
was available for two players, and the subsequent 1800 MHz spectrum was allocated in a way 
to create opportunity for at least one new player. It seemed that the growing demand form 
mobile telephony made it possible to strengthen competition by increasing the number of 
operators. This hypothesis that new spectrum makes new entry possible and viable was not 
questioned and thought to be working by regulators (see the discussion of Gruber's view on 
the "n + 1 rule" in the previous Chapter). 
After the allocation of the spectrum in many Western European countries by 2002, there were 
lot of failed expectations concerning entry or large auction revenues in those markets where 
the process started later. In countries where new players won licenses around 2000, the entry 
boom turned to bust as some entries were delayed or even aborted. In other countries, the 
auctions failed to attract operators others than the incumbents. The reasons were manifold, but 
the technological problems concerning UMTS networks and data speed provided, the 
unavailability of handsets and services, and the lack of demand were certainly among them. 
Nevertheless, the first new networks were turned on, commercial offers appeared on the 
market in 2003 and the slower than expected take-up started.
12
 Some regulatory ease of the 
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coverage requirements or even license fees, and some leniency concerning network sharing in 
some countries were applied to support the advance of the new networks. By the second half 
of the decade, the implementation of HSPA enhancement to the UMTS networks and the 
availability of new devices like USB modems and later smartphones made 3G a much 
demanded service. However, the question of viability of changing market structure and 
competition by inviting new entrants still remained an issue to be judged by the subsequent 
market developments. 
For the ex-post evaluation of entries, it is very important to note that winning a spectrum 
license does not necessarily mean that the mobile operator actually entered the market. 
Several companies returned the spectrum without effectively using it and wrote down the 
material and goodwill losses. There were cases when the regulator withdrew the licenses 
because the license holder did not fulfill its commitments. Actual commercial entry offering 
voice and data services for customers occurred in many cases only 1-3 years later than the 
legal entry of the company to the respective national market. Therefore, official statistics (like 
the ones published by the Directorate General for Information Society of the European 
Commission, DG InfoSoc) on the actual number of mobile operators can be misleading. In 
order to draw the real competitive landscape for each country, we complemented and 
corrected official statistics with information available on mobile operators’ websites or other 
industry information sources on the time of effective entry on each market. 
The next table demonstrates how the number of active operators evolved between 2000 and 
2012 in the current 27 Member State of the European Union.
13
 These aggregate numbers 
show the results of effective entries and mergers in each years. We do not observe exits in this 
period in the sense that an already supplying mobile operator stopped its service that was 
available for years.
14
 Until 2003, that is before the launch of 3G networks, the number of 
operators only refers to the number of active 2G players. The numbers after 2000 show that in 
some countries new 2G networks were launched earlier and 3G was awarded later, but in 
other cases these two licenses were awarded together for newcomers. Operators with only 2G 
or 3G licenses and operators with both type of licenses were always counted as one player.
15
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1800 MHz and 2100 MHz bands. 
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Table 2. Number of countries with 1-5 active operators between 2000 and 2012 (as effective 
at the 1st of January of each year) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1 operator 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 operators 8 6 6 6 5 6 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 
3 operators 11 13 14 15 14 14 15 14 15 14 14 14 14 
4 operators 4 5 5 4 3 4 6 8 9 9 10 11 12 
5 operators 1 1 1 1 4 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 0 
              
We can observe from in this table that although there was large variance in the number of 
operators in 2000, this number stabilized as a result of entries and mergers at the level of 3 or 
4 operators for all countries (except Cyprus) by 2012. We identified 27 entries and 8 mergers 
between 2000 and 2012. 
The average number of operators per country increased from 2.70 in 2000 to 3.41 by 2012. 
The 0.7 increase is closer to one, and might be hastily interpreted as being in line with the 
hypothesis that the n + 1 rule has been working. However, all the 7 of the 28 entries before 
2003 were late 2G entries. From 2003 only 3G entries occurred, so the average increase from 
2.93 in 2003 to 3.41 in 2012 is below 0.5.  
The structural changes on many markets happened because of regulatory steps releasing new 
spectrum for providing mobile services with the intention or expectation of enhancing 
competition on the market. The success of this policy must be judged by the results. This huge 
number of changes in the structures of national mobile markets provides a very good 
opportunity for assessing the intertemporal changes due to entries (and mergers) and whether 
this entry-enhancing policy has contributed to decreasing prices. 
The graph below shows that average prices were indeed significantly falling in the observed 
period. For this illustration, we include prices only for countries where we have observations 
for all years, so we start from 2004 when 10 new Member States joined the European Union. 
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Graph 3. Average level of OECD mobile voice basket prices for 24 European Member States 
between 2004-2010 (base = 2004) 
 
 
4. Database 
Our price database builds on the regular yearly reports prepared by Teligen for DG InfoSoc, 
available for years between 2003 and 2010. As there exists no universal price indicator for 
mobile services, the OECD defined three product baskets for low, medium and high usage 
levels in 2002.
16
 The OECD baskets were redefined in 2006 and 2009 in order to take care of 
changing consumption patterns and facilitate inter-country comparisons, but we use the 
OECD 2002 basket prices for all years as we want to track the intertemporal changes of 
prices. For each country, the price of the respective consumption pattern was computed for all 
mobile packages offered in the respective period, and the price of the two cheapest 
alternatives are published for the two leading operators in the given country. All published 
prices are in Euros and include VAT. 
The published prices indicate prices in August or September of the respective year. As for 
each country-time observation we have two prices for each basket, we construct average 
prices for baskets because we believe that average prices are better country-specific indicators 
than firm-specific prices. For each country-time observation, we also form a representative 
average price by taking the mean of the three average basket prices. The advantage of using 
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line phones, 58% to mobile phones. Medium usage basket: 75 outgoing calls (148 minutes) per month + 35 SMS 
messages, 36% of calls are to fixed line phones, 64% to mobile phones. High usage basket: 150 outgoing calls 
(315 minutes) per month + 42 SMS messages, 40% of calls are to fixed line phones, 60% to mobile phones. 
Only post-paid prices are measured, and they include the monthly rental and registration charges distributed over 
3 years. 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
values 100% 83% 60% 54% 51% 47% 51%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
10 
 
multiple prices is that we can estimate our specifications for each of them in order to check 
the robustness of our results. 
For 15 countries, we have price observations from 2003 till 2010. For 10 Member States 
joining in 2004, we have prices only from 2004 (except for Cyprus, for which they are 
available from 2007), and from 2007 for two additional Member States joining in 2007. In 
total, we have 195 observations in our panel. 
Note that there might be some measurement errors present concerning the prices, as we 
observe countries for which prices were stable for 2 years and then showed a price decrease of 
20-40%. Still, we do not think these values should be categorized as outliers, because drastic 
price decreases can happen in mobile markets. Furthermore, we observe but the lowest prices 
for exogenously chosen consumption baskets, not average prices. Therefore, we retained these 
observations, partly because our database is very small, and more importantly we could have 
missed some entry shocks that we wish to evaluate. 
The next table summarizes all relevant dependent and control variables for each country-time 
observation.
17
 Simple descriptive statistics on these variables can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 4. Description of main variables 
Abbreviation Description Source 
Plow Average price for low usage mobile basket (OECD2002) DG InfoSoc 
Pmid Average price for medium usage mobile basket (OECD2002) DG InfoSoc 
Phigh Average price for high usage mobile basket (OECD2002) DG InfoSoc 
Pav Mean of the average basket prices  
GDPcap GDP per capita Eurostat 
Pop Population Eurostat 
Exch Average annual exchange rate (Euro/domestic currency) ECB 
Inflation  Inflation rate stacked from base year 2003 Eurostat 
Vat Value added tax on mobile services (standard rate) EC 
MTR Average mobile termination charge DG InfoSoc 
Pen Mobile penetration
18
 Eurostat 
MVNO Dummy variable measuring present of MVNO Own research 
 
The previous Chapter discussed the calculation of operators' number in a country. However, 
we have to differentiate between "early" events already affecting prices in the same year (note 
that prices are measured in August) and "later" events that could have affected prices only 
from the second part of the year. As we are measuring only the prices of the two main 
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operators, the entrant's prices are not included yet in the country's average price. It is a 
common industrial view that adjustment to competitors' new pricing strategy requires 2-3 
months. Therefore, we assume first that if an entry or merger occurred till the end of May of 
year t, than it already affected prices in August, and in this case we refer to this event as 
happening in year t. On the other hand, if the event occurred after May of year t, than we refer 
to this event happening / taking effect in year (t + 1). For entries, we consider the date for the 
launch of services available from operators' websites for this calculation. For mergers, we 
consider the date of the competition authority's clearing decision. We can also test the 
robustness of our results by checking the estimations with different periods of time till the 
events start to have effect - one could even study whether prices started to decrease before 
entry effectively took place but was already public knowledge due to the known results of the 
spectrum allocation. 
 
5. Estimation strategy and separation of effects 
The ideal method to estimate the effects of entries and mergers would be to conduct 
controlled experiments. This would mean selecting national markets with identical market 
structures, let the event happen for a randomly selected subgroup (treatment group) but not on 
the other markets (control group), and then the difference of post-event price changes between 
the treatment and control markets would provide the effect of interest.  
As these controlled experiments are not possible with entries and mergers, we follow a quasi-
experimental design by tracking the whole sample of national markets over the observation 
period, and for each effect to be separated we compare the pre- and post-merger price 
differentials between affected and non-affected markets. We are thus identifying our 
parameters of interest from variation in the number of players in observed countries over time. 
The motivation behind this difference-in-differences comparison is that observations on non-
affected markets can form a counterfactual by informing us about what would have happened 
to the affected markets had the event not taken place. Controlling for additional factors like 
demand and market structure ensures that we compare as similar subjects as possible. 
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We implement this estimation strategy by estimating panel regressions with country and time 
fixed effects. Our estimated equations will take the following general form: 
 
ittiit
j
jitjit vucontrolssp   , 
 
where i indexes countries and t indexes time periods. A country-time observation can be 
subject of one or several shocks indicated by dummy variables sjit, for which we estimate our 
main parameters of interest j . Unobserved heterogeneity will be captured by country fixed 
effects, which is important in our case also because assignment to treatment and control status 
is not random. Time fixed effects control for changes in common unobservable variables to all 
countries in a given period. 
In the basic case, a country will be subject of an entry treatment e from period t (as discussed 
before, this means that entry took place before the end of May).
19
 When we want to 
differentiate on the type of entry, treatment exy will refer to the situation if entry happened at 
a market with originally x active operators so it became a y-player market. We also want to 
separate the effects on the entrant's type, and so treatment exy_big shows if a multinational 
firm entered the respective market,
20
 while local entrants the country is subject to treatment 
exy_small. Finally, when we separate different effects for different time periods for the same 
event, exy_1 = 1 only in the first year after the xy entry, exy_2 = 1 only in the second year 
after the xy entry, and exy_3 = 1 for all years from the third after the entry.
21
 
Treatments are similarly defined for mergers denoted by m, but here the type of the firms 
involved is not separated. Note that the treatments take care of changes in the number of 
operators, so this control should not be added to the regressions as country-fixed effects 
implicitly include the number of operators in the first year observed. We can also add 
treatments together, we will for example use deltaop = e - m to measure how the number of 
operators changed up to the respective year from the first period. 
Naturally, a national market can be subject to several treatments during the observed period. 
Note however, that the treatment and control groups are different for each effect, and this is 
the crucial fact that makes the identification of each effect possible. Let us take the example 
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 Big multinational firms are Deutsche Telekom, Telefonica, Orange, Vodafone, and Hutchison. 
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separation into 3 different time periods seems reasonable.  
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of a hypothetical country A with 3 operators in 2003, entrant Hutchison starting operation in 
March 2006, and then a merger of any two active operators in December 2007. Then for this 
specific country e34big_1 = 1 for 2006, e34big_2 = 1 for 2007, e34big_3 = 1 for 2008-2010, 
m43_1 = 1 for 2008, m43_2 = 1 for 2009 and m43_3 = 1 for 2010. Country-time observation 
A-2006 is therefore in the treatment group of effect e34big_1, but is also in the control group 
of all merger effects. 
The following table illustrates how the studied events affected the different European markets. 
To clarify again, by entry date we mean the year when the company effectively started to 
offer mobile services on the market, not the year when it acquired the necessary spectrum for 
it. Note that we also include events that are affecting prices in all periods observed, like for 
example Hutchison's 2003 entry in Italy. When we are assuming a universal treatment for all 
periods observed (like entry treatment e), these observations will be used by the estimation 
method as if they were in the control group. However, when we are estimating  dynamic 
effects (entry treatments e34big_1, e34big_2, e34big_3), then different observations for this 
country will be affected by different treatments, so will belong to different treatment groups. 
 
Table 5. Assessed entries and mergers for the observed period in 27 countries 
 Countries 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Stabile 2 ops  1 country         
Stabile 3 ops 9 countries         
Stabile 4 ops 2 countries         
2-3 entry:  
5 countries 
2 big 
3 small 
Latvia    Small     
Luxembourg   Big      
Malta       Small  
Slovakia     Big    
Slovenia      Small   
3-4 entry:  
8 countries 
3 big 
5 small 
Ireland    Big     
Italy Big        
Luxembourg        Small 
Poland     Small    
Romania     Small    
Slovenia       Small  
Spain     Small    
Sweden  Big       
4-5 entry: 
1 big 
1 small 
Denmark  Big       
Poland        Small 
4-3 merger:  
1 case 
Netherlands      X   
5-4 merger:  
4 cases 
Austria    X     
Denmark   X      
Netherlands    X     
United Kingdom        X 
14 
 
 
There are several affected countries for most of the effects to be estimated and they occur in 
different time periods, which are useful properties for our estimations. Note also that among 
the big multinational firm entries, all 2-to-3 entries correspond to the so called "Big4" firms 
(T-Mobile, Orange, O2 and Vodafone) that are incumbents in some European countries, while 
all 3-to-4 and 4-to-5 entries are by Hutchison which is nowhere in an incumbent position. The 
small entries were almost always done by firms usually called "challengers" or "mavericks" 
(like Tele2, Bite, DigiMobil), so they do not belong to regional multinational firms that are 
incumbent in a country (like TeliaSonera or Telekom Austria).
22
 
 
5.1 Discussion of econometric problems 
Note that our estimated effects are guaranteed to be unbiased only if entry and merger events 
can be considered as exogenous country-specific shocks, or more specifically that the price 
developments in the respective countries did not influence the firm's decisions regarding the 
timing of entries and mergers. However, evidence found by Gruber (2005, 2007) and Garrard 
(1998) discussed before indicates that the entry choices are driven much more by the 
regulator's more general (and less unambiguous) objectives and not necessarily on the careful 
ex-ante consideration of pricing trends. Even if prices are then rationally chosen by the firms 
following entry, industry experiences hint at the fact that the entry decision itself is often 
based on factors other than price expectations.  
On top of this "verbal" justification, consider it for a moment what kind of endogeneity would 
be problematic for our estimations. Our effects to be estimated are linearly shifting the trend 
of prices and the assumption behind our DID estimation method is that price changes in non-
affected countries can form a valid counterfactual for the treated countries. If firms observe or 
expect different price levels in different countries and base their entry decisions on this 
experience, this behavior alone does not violate the critical assumption of exogeneity for our 
estimations. Endogeneity becomes a potential problem only if countries are selected (by the 
firms involved) for the specific treatment group because different trends of price changes are 
expected for them, as then comparing differences between treatment and control groups are 
misleading. Naturally, we cannot exclude that entries and mergers are based on these more 
advanced expectations (in a perfect world of rational business decisions they should), but this 
kind of problematic endogeneity is less likely to be satisfied in reality. 
                                                          
22
 The only exception is the entry of Xfera owned by TeliaSonera to Spain, but it is branded under a different 
name and did not gain considerable market share. 
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In general, there exist various econometric techniques dealing with the potentially existing 
endogeneity problem,
23
 but these methods are hard to apply in our case. As the events happen 
in different time periods, exploratory "tests" of endogeneity based on comparing the time 
series of prices between several treatment and control groups are not applicable. 
Theoretically, using instruments could offer a possible solution for taking care of 
endogeneity, but it would be very hard to find variables correlated with the events, but not 
correlated with the prices. 
Another important problem to address with DID estimation is that their estimated standard 
errors can be serially correlated, which biases the standard errors.
24
 This problem should be 
seriously considered in our case, as serial correlation is very much expected for our 
decreasing trends of prices (and in fact will be always found). There are various estimation 
techniques available to correct for serial correlation,
25
 we use the most intuitive (although not 
the most efficient) method of estimating our specification on the differentiated time series. In 
this way, we lose one period of observations, but as country-fixed effects are not estimated 
anymore, the degree of freedom of our estimations is basically unchanged. 
 
6. Empirical results 
Now we are presenting our main results using the empirical framework defined in the 
previous Chapter. We run our regressions for the log of prices, so the estimated effects for the 
treatments can be interpreted as percentage changes in prices due to the event. We cluster 
standard errors by country to account for within-group correlation. As we have four prices 
(low, medium and high basket and the average of these three) for all country-time 
observations, we use the results for all of them to look for robust patterns. We consider a 
result stronger if more regressions provide a significant estimate of the same sign. 
If we are estimating our regression on the level of variables, we encounter the problem of 
serial correlation mentioned in the previous Chapter.
26
 Therefore, in the main text we display 
only the results from the estimation on first differences, and Appendix 2 includes estimation 
results on levels for the first and the last specification. We should note that our qualitative 
results change considerably, so we should indeed be careful of the serial correlation problem 
when evaluating the price effects of telecom entries and mergers. 
                                                          
23
 See for example Wooldridge (2002) for a detailed overview. 
24
 See Bertrand et al (2004).  
25
 Again, see Wooldridge (2002). 
26
 We use the test developed by Woodridge (2002), implemented by Stata command xtseries. 
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We include the full set of possible controls presented in Chapter 4, even though a large subset 
of them will be consistently insignificant. When estimating in differences, the only control 
that is consequently and strongly significant is the population of the specific country, which 
can be interpreted as a demand control. On the other hand, variables controlling for country 
level price changes (inflation and exchange rate) and for potential cost changes influencing 
telecommunications prices (penetration, mobile termination rates and VAT) turn out to be 
mostly insignificant, even though we observe variation in some of them. Interestingly, the 
presence (entry) of an MVNO has a small but positive effect on prices when significant. 
Almost all time fixed effects will be insignificant with the estimations in differences, but we 
do not display estimates for them. 
We start with a very basic estimation and then progress step-by-step, in order to demonstrate 
that the separation of effects to account for different features of entries and mergers can 
become very important for a correct ex-post evaluation. We give a detailed interpretation of 
the effects after our final specification. 
First, we explain the changes in prices only with the change in the number of operators, 
deltaop = e - m. This specification is equivalent with the usual approach of price-
concentration analyses where we include the number of operators in the regressions. 
 
Table 6. Results for regressing log of prices on the change in number of operators, 
estimation on first differences 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 d_logPlow  d_logPmid  d_logPhigh  d_logPav  
VARIABLES coef se coef se Coef Se coef se 
         
d_deltaop -0.12* (0.07) -0.12* (0.07) -0.12* (0.07) -0.12* (0.06) 
d_mvno -0.02 (0.04) 0.14*** (0.04) 0.13** (0.06) 0.11** (0.05) 
d_logGDPcap 0.16 (0.58) -0.26 (0.54) 0.05 (0.53) -0.03 (0.51) 
d_logPop 9.08*** (2.80) 8.62*** (2.84) 10.11*** (3.11) 9.48*** (2.81) 
d_logExch 0.90 (0.72) 1.14 (0.77) 0.86 (0.77) 0.92 (0.72) 
d_inflation -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
d_vat -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 
d_logPen -0.43 (0.31) -0.37 (0.32) -0.12 (0.36) -0.25 (0.32) 
d_logTerm -0.24** (0.11) -0.06 (0.10) -0.10 (0.11) -0.11 (0.10) 
Constant -0.06 (0.07) -0.05 (0.06) -0.10* (0.06) -0.08 (0.06) 
Country FE NO  NO  NO  NO  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  
Observations 168  168  168  168  
R-squared 0.28  0.26  0.25  0.27  
p-value for H0: 
error term AR(1) 
0.47  0.35  0.46 
 
0.48 
 
 
Robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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This rough specification provides point estimates indicating that an increase (decrease) in the 
number of operators leads to a weakly significant 12% price decrease (increase) on average 
compared to the trend of non-affected countries. If this result proved to be robust, it could 
provide a basis for an activist entry and merger regulation. 
Now let us allow different price effects for entries and mergers. Here we assume a linear 
effect of entries or mergers, so if for example two entries happen between 2006 and 2008, 
then the estimated effect after 2008 should be interpreted as two times the coefficient for 
treatment e. 
 
Table 7. Results for regressing log of prices on the simple treatments of entry and merger, 
estimation on first differences 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 d_logPlow  d_logPmid  d_logPhigh  d_logPav  
VARIABLES coef se coef se coef Se coef se 
d_e -0.13 (0.09) -0.18** (0.09) -0.18* (0.09) -0.17* (0.09) 
d_m 0.08 (0.08) -0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 
d_mvno -0.01 (0.04) 0.15*** (0.04) 0.14** (0.06) 0.12*** (0.05) 
d_logGDPcap 0.18 (0.58) -0.19 (0.53) 0.12 (0.52) 0.03 (0.50) 
d_logPop 9.17*** (2.82) 8.96*** (2.93) 10.43*** (3.19) 9.76*** (2.89) 
d_logExch 0.89 (0.72) 1.11 (0.77) 0.83 (0.76) 0.89 (0.71) 
d_inflation -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
d_vat -0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 
d_logPen -0.42 (0.32) -0.34 (0.33) -0.08 (0.37) -0.22 (0.33) 
d_logTerm -0.23** (0.11) -0.05 (0.10) -0.08 (0.11) -0.10 (0.10) 
Constant -0.06 (0.07) -0.04 (0.06) -0.10* (0.06) -0.07 (0.06) 
Country fixed effects NO  NO  NO  NO  
Year fixed effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
Observations 168  168  168  168  
R-squared 0.28  0.27  0.26  0.28  
p-value for H0: 
error term AR(1) 
0.41  0.28  0.46  0.41  
Robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
We see considerable changes from previous results: entries are shown to have a weakly 
significant price-decreasing effects of 17-18% (except on the low-type basket), but we find no 
significant effects for mergers.  
We can now turn to our first main research question on whether the effects depend on the 
number of active operators before the event. The next table shows our estimates for treatments 
separated by the type of entries and merger depending on the number of operators before the 
event. 
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Table 8. Results for regressing log of prices on entry and merger treatments depending on the 
number of operators before the event, estimation on first differences 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 d_logPlow  d_logPmid  d_logPhigh  d_logPav  
VARIABLES coef se coef se coef se coef se 
d_e23 -0.14 (0.19) -0.20 (0.21) -0.19 (0.20) -0.18 (0.20) 
d_e34 -0.11 (0.10) -0.13 (0.08) -0.13 (0.11) -0.13 (0.09) 
d_e45 -0.18 (0.23) -0.26*** (0.05) -0.30*** (0.05) -0.28*** (0.05) 
d_m43 -0.02 (0.07) -0.11* (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) -0.08 (0.06) 
d_m54 0.11 (0.10) -0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05) 0.02 (0.04) 
d_mvno -0.02 (0.04) 0.15*** (0.05) 0.14** (0.06) 0.12** (0.05) 
d_logGDPcap 0.18 (0.58) -0.19 (0.52) 0.11 (0.51) 0.03 (0.49) 
d_logPop 8.88*** (2.59) 8.41*** (2.85) 9.82*** (3.17) 9.21*** (2.82) 
d_logExch 0.90 (0.73) 1.12 (0.77) 0.86 (0.77) 0.92 (0.72) 
d_inflation -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
d_vat -0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 
d_logPen -0.41 (0.34) -0.32 (0.35) -0.08 (0.39) -0.21 (0.35) 
d_logTerm -0.23** (0.11) -0.04 (0.10) -0.07 (0.11) -0.09 (0.10) 
Constant -0.05 (0.07) -0.04 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) -0.06 (0.06) 
Country FE NO  NO  NO  NO  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  
Observations 168  168  168  168  
R-squared 0.28  0.28  0.27  0.29  
p-value for H0: 
error term AR(1) 
0.63  0.29  0.39 
 
0.35 
 
Robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
These results already show that the effect separation based on the number of active operators 
before the event is important. The price-decreasing effects of entries are still to be found, but 
they turn out to be significant only for the 4-to-5 entries (-25 to -30% on average compared to 
the price trend of 4-operator countries not affected by additional entry). However, we should 
be careful to interpret our estimates for 4-to-5 entries as general results as both of them 
occurred rather specially: the multinational entry in 2004 in Denmark was followed by a 
merger in a year, while the small entry in 2010 in Poland affected only one year in our 
sample. 
For mergers, we mostly find insignificant price effects and never significantly positive ones. 
However, we can reject the hypothesis that x-to-y entries and y-to-x mergers have the same 
magnitude effect on prices, but only with the opposite sign (H0: d_e34 + d_m43 = 0 and H0: 
d_e45 + d_m54 = 0). This hypothesis is usually behind using entry studies as substitutes for 
merger simulations,
27
 but our results provide additional evidence for the critique of this 
approach. 
                                                          
27
 This element was present, for example, in the assessment of the Ryanair /Aer Lingus merger (COMP/M.4439). 
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Now we examine whether the type of entrant (big multinational or small local) firm matters 
for evaluating the effect of entry. 
 
Table 9. Results for regressing log of prices on entry and merger treatments depending on the 
number of operators before the event and the entrant's type, estimation on first differences 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 d_logPlow  d_logPmid  d_logPhigh  d_logPav  
VARIABLES coef se coef Se coef se coef se 
d_e23big 0.03 (0.13) 0.13 (0.10) 0.11 (0.10) 0.11 (0.10) 
d_e34big 0.02 (0.17) 0.03 (0.09) 0.05 (0.05) 0.04 (0.07) 
d_e45big -0.51*** (0.06) -0.29*** (0.05) -0.26*** (0.05) -0.31*** (0.05) 
d_e23sm -0.24 (0.29) -0.41 (0.28) -0.39 (0.29) -0.37 (0.29) 
d_e34sm -0.23*** (0.06) -0.26*** (0.06) -0.29* (0.15) -0.27*** (0.09) 
d_e45sm 0.14** (0.06) -0.23*** (0.07) -0.34*** (0.07) -0.24*** (0.07) 
d_m43 -0.03 (0.07) -0.11** (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) 
d_m54 0.11 (0.09) 0.00 (0.04) 0.02 (0.05) 0.03 (0.04) 
d_mvno -0.00 (0.05) 0.18*** (0.05) 0.16** (0.07) 0.14** (0.06) 
d_logGDPcap 0.28 (0.58) -0.04 (0.50) 0.27 (0.49) 0.17 (0.47) 
d_logPop 8.08*** (2.50) 7.46*** (2.71) 8.95*** (3.06) 8.32*** (2.69) 
d_logExch 0.65 (0.68) 0.91 (0.72) 0.70 (0.74) 0.73 (0.67) 
d_inflation -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
d_vat -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 
d_logPen -0.54* (0.31) -0.51 (0.32) -0.26 (0.37) -0.39 (0.32) 
d_logTerm -0.21* (0.11) -0.03 (0.10) -0.07 (0.11) -0.08 (0.10) 
Constant -0.02 (0.07) -0.03 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) -0.06 (0.06) 
Country FE NO  NO  NO  NO  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  
Observations 168  168  168  168  
R-squared 0.32  0.32  0.30  0.32  
p-value for H0: 
error term AR(1) 
0.67  0.31  0.21  0.27 
 
 
Robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
This separation proves to be rather important, as we now see clear differences in the results 
for multinational and local entries.
28
 The point estimates for the price effects of 2-to-3 and 3-
to-4 multinational entries are always positive, although never significant. However, we see 
large price-decreasing effect for local entries, and the parameters are robustly significant for 
3-to-4 small entries (-23 to -29% on average compared to the price trend of 3-operator 
countries not affected by additional local entry). For 3-to-4 entries, we also find that the 
parameter estimates for multinational and local entries are significantly different from each 
other.  
                                                          
28
 There is no qualitative change for the effects of mergers from the previous specification, which was to be 
expected as we did not apply a different separation for merger effects. 
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So far, we assumed that the effect of any event is the same for all the years after it occurred, 
which does not necessarily hold. In order to test this hypothesis, let us further separate the 
price effect of each event for the first year and the second year (short run effects) and jointly 
for all subsequent years after the third (long run effect), which will be our final specification. 
 
Table 10. Results for regressing log of prices on entry and merger treatments depending on 
the number of operators and the entrant's type, separated for 1st, 2nd and subsequent years, 
estimation on first differences 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 d_logPlow  d_logPmid  d_logPhigh  d_logPav  
VARIABLES coef se Coef se coef se coef se 
d_e23big_1 0.03 (0.13) 0.11 (0.10) 0.08 (0.10) 0.08 (0.10) 
d_e23big_2 0.13 (0.15) 0.28** (0.13) 0.32** (0.15) 0.28** (0.14) 
d_e23big_3 0.10 (0.19) 0.14 (0.14) -0.06 (0.21) 0.03 (0.17) 
d_e34big_1 0.00 (0.14) 0.01 (0.07) 0.03 (0.04) 0.02 (0.06) 
d_e34big_2 -0.23 (0.20) -0.18 (0.12) -0.20* (0.12) -0.20 (0.12) 
d_e34big_3 -0.18 (0.22) -0.17 (0.14) -0.25 (0.15) -0.21 (0.15) 
d_e45big_1 -0.53*** (0.06) -0.30*** (0.05) -0.26*** (0.05) -0.31*** (0.05) 
d_e45big_2 -0.41*** (0.14) -0.25*** (0.08) -0.18** (0.08) -0.24*** (0.08) 
d_e45big_3 -0.00 (0.25) 0.28 (0.33) 0.38 (0.28) 0.29 (0.29) 
d_e23sm_1 -0.22 (0.30) -0.38 (0.29) -0.34 (0.29) -0.33 (0.29) 
d_e23sm_2 -0.02 (0.35) -0.28 (0.33) -0.28 (0.32) -0.24 (0.32) 
d_e23sm_3 0.17 (0.35) -0.17 (0.34) -0.24 (0.33) -0.15 (0.33) 
d_e34sm_1 -0.29*** (0.07) -0.29*** (0.10) -0.33* (0.19) -0.31** (0.13) 
d_e34sm_2 -0.34** (0.14) -0.13 (0.13) -0.02 (0.21) -0.10 (0.16) 
d_e34sm_3 -0.08 (0.19) 0.24 (0.18) 0.37 (0.24) 0.26 (0.19) 
d_e45sm_1 0.16** (0.07) -0.21*** (0.07) -0.33*** (0.08) -0.22*** (0.07) 
d_m43_1 -0.19** (0.08) -0.02 (0.21) 0.19 (0.13) 0.06 (0.12) 
d_m43_2 -0.13 (0.11) 0.08 (0.21) 0.29** (0.14) 0.15 (0.13) 
d_m43_3 -0.11 (0.12) 0.37* (0.22) 0.39** (0.16) 0.29** (0.15) 
d_m54_1 0.07 (0.12) -0.01 (0.05) 0.00 (0.06) 0.01 (0.05) 
d_m54_2 -0.20 (0.25) -0.17 (0.33) 0.04 (0.28) -0.06 (0.28) 
d_m54_3 -0.05 (0.26) -0.26 (0.39) -0.22 (0.30) -0.20 (0.30) 
d_mvno -0.01 (0.06) 0.16** (0.06) 0.13* (0.07) 0.12* (0.06) 
d_logGDPcap 0.19 (0.63) -0.22 (0.54) 0.08 (0.53) -0.00 (0.50) 
d_logPop 8.85*** (2.84) 8.33*** (2.80) 10.75*** (3.05) 9.70*** (2.75) 
d_logPen -0.65** (0.33) -0.52 (0.35) -0.35 (0.35) -0.46 (0.33) 
d_logExch 0.83 (0.81) 1.26 (0.83) 1.11 (0.80) 1.08 (0.75) 
d_inflation -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
d_logTerm -0.17 (0.12) -0.01 (0.11) -0.07 (0.12) -0.07 (0.11) 
d_vat 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 
Constant 0.01 (0.08) -0.01 (0.07) -0.09 (0.07) -0.05 (0.06) 
Country FE NO  NO  NO  NO  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  
Observations 168  168  168  168  
R-squared 0.37  0.38  0.41  0.41  
p-value for H0: 
error term AR(1) 
0.83  0.57  0.95 
 
0.77 
 
Robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Now we see a striking difference compared to our previous results, as now our estimates 
reveal important insights into the price dynamics of different entry types. Concerning 2-to-3 
entries first, the point estimates still signal differences between the effect of multinational and 
local entries: the previous ones are mostly positive while the latter ones negative. However, 
the only effect that is statistically different from zero is the second-year effect of the entry of a 
multinational firm: so even if the presence of 3rd multinational entrant has a price-increasing 
effect in the short-run, the price trend of a country affected by this type of entry goes back to 
the price trend of an otherwise similar country not affected by this type of entry. Based on all 
the specifications, our estimations indicate the insignificant impact of 2-to-3 entries on mobile 
voice price between 2003 and 2010 (compared to the trend of similar countries not affected by 
the entry of a 3rd operator), which result is quite robust to separations based on entrant's type 
and the timing of the effects. 
On the other hand, we do have a more refined picture for 3-to-4 entries. The point estimates 
for a fourth multinational big entrant (which was always Hutchison) indicate price-increasing 
first-year effects, but price-decreasing second-year and long-run effects, although they are 
almost never significant. However, if the fourth entrant is a small challenger firm, the effect 
mechanism is exactly the opposite: small entrants have a robust significant price-decreasing 
effect only in the first year (-29-33%) but none significant thereafter with the point estimates 
being even positive on the long-run.  
We can also test whether the same year effects are the same for multinational and local entries 
(H0: e34big_i = e34sm_i for i = 1, 2, 3) and we find that first-year price effect is significantly 
larger for multinational firms (so their entry was more price-increasing / less price-decreasing 
on the short-run), while the long-run price effect is significantly larger for local firms. These 
findings support conventional industry wisdom that local and multinational entrants usually 
adopt different strategies: local entrants initially price more aggressively in order to quickly 
gain market share and reach a viable size, while multinational firms can take a more patient 
approach and the latter can have a more beneficial effect on the long-run. 
We have already noted that we should be careful with the interpretation of results on 4-to-5 
entries due to only one observation in both categories, which makes it more likely that the 
estimated parameters will be significant and of large magnitude (as it takes up most of the 
residuals for specific country-year observations). 
There are important changes in the results concerning the effects of mergers as well and 
different price dynamics are shown for 4-to-3 and 5-to-4 mergers. For the only 4-to-3 merger 
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in our sample, we do not find robustly significant short-run effects, but we see a price-
increase on the long run due to the merger: on average +29% compared to the price trend of 
4-operator countries.
29
 This result could also indicate why recent 4-to-3 mergers received 
thorough examination by competition authorities in the last few years and were cleared only 
after adopting substantial remedies. 
For 5-to-4 mergers, we do not find significant effects, but the point estimates are negative on 
the long-run. This result is in line with general competition policy thinking on merger effects: 
5-to-4 mergers were almost never found to be anticompetitive and beneficial effects are rather 
expected from a consolidation to a 4-player model, which seems one of the focal points to 
which national mobile markets converge.  
 
6.1 Further discussion of estimation results 
In this final part, we discuss some comments that naturally come to mind when looking at our 
approach. 
First, our study analyzes only the price development of mobile voice services. As mobile 
operators typically offer both voice and data services, it would be beneficial to study the 
parallel price trends for both services, but this type of data is unfortunately not available. 
However, the importance of data services increased considerably only by the emergence of 
smartphones from 2010, and bundling became more widespread thereafter. We might thus 
expect that entries and mergers had a larger effect on the pricing of voice services during the 
studied period of 2003-2010, and so a separate study of voice price trends could offer 
important insights on its own. 
Second, we do not have average voice prices for the respective markets, but prices for three 
OECD defined consumption baskets. It would have been much more useful to work with 
measures like average voice revenue per minute (ARPM), but this data is publicly available 
only for a few years (DG InfoSoc published it only for 2009 and 2010). However, the signs of 
the estimated effects are mostly in line with industry experience, which can give confidence to 
our qualitative results, but one should be more careful with interpreting the magnitude of 
significant price effects. 
The endogeneity problem between entry and prices was already discussed in Chapter 5.1, one 
that does not have a perfect solution to tackle. One might also argue that there is already a 
selection problem in why some countries started with 3 or 4 operators in the early 2000s. One 
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 As the long-run effect is the average yearly effect after the third year of a merger , it is less problematic that 
we have only one merger to identify this effect from. 
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way to check whether this presents a problem can be that when we are measuring the effect of 
3-to-4 entries, we include only countries with a stable number of 3 operators in the control 
group. On a conceptual level, the general difference-in-differences approach separately 
estimates the parameters for 3-to-4 entries from this subsample, but it is true that the 
parameters for the control variables are estimated from the full sample. 
We can successfully perform this approach only for 3-to-4 entries, as those are the ones with a 
sufficient number of observations. The next table shows the important estimates for these two 
specifications only for the average price.
30
 It turns out that the difference between the 
estimates on 3-to-4 price effects is minimal, so our results would be almost the same. The 
only meaningful difference is that in the second approach the long-run beneficial effect of 
multinational entries is also significant and of larger magnitude, which just strengthens the 
points we made before. 
 
Table 11. Comparing results on 3-to-4 entries by regressing log of prices on all treatments 
based on full sample and regressing prices on only 3-to-4 treatments on the subsample of 
countries starting with 3 operators, with only relevant estimates displayed 
 (1)  (2)  
 d_logPav  d_logPav  
VARIABLES Full sample se 3-operator subsample  se 
d_e34big_1 0.02 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 
d_e34big_2 -0.20 (0.12) -0.21 (0.14) 
d_e34big_3 -0.21 (0.15) -0.22** (0.08) 
d_e34sm_1 -0.31** (0.13) -0.32*** (0.10) 
d_e34sm_2 -0.10 (0.16) -0.01 (0.19) 
d_e34sm_3 0.26 (0.19) 0.43* (0.21) 
Country FE NO  NO  
Year FE YES  YES  
Observations 168  95  
R-squared 0.41  0.47  
H0: error term AR(1)  (p-value) 0.77  0.66  
 
We clearly have a selection problem for mergers, as the observed ones were all mergers 
investigated by European competition authorities. Therefore, we cannot draw the general 
conclusion that any 5-to-4 merger would have had no effect, only that clearing the mergers in 
our sample (with or without remedies) was justified by studying ex-post evidence on voice 
prices. 
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 The full table  can be found in Appendix 3. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper developed an impact assessment method to evaluate the effect of entries and 
mergers on the price of mobile voice services in a panel database of 27 European Member 
States between 2003 and 2010. We showed that effects depend very much on the number of 
active operators and the type of entrant, and not controlling for these differences results in 
misleading conclusions.  
We found no robust evidence for that entry has a long-lasting price-decreasing effect on 
markets with originally 2 operators relative the trend of decreasing prices without entry, 
independent from the entrant's type. We showed beneficial effects for the entry of a 4th 
operator, but different price dynamics according to the entrant's type. After separating entry 
effects for different years, we found significant price-decreasing effects for local entrants only 
in the first year after entry, while the price-decreasing effects for multinational entries are 
present in the long-run. The effects for the entry of 5th operator are significant with the 
dynamics also dependent on firm's type, but these latter results should be interpreted 
carefully. Finally, we found a long-run price-increasing effect for the only 4-to-3 merger in 
our sample, but none for the 5-to-4 mergers. 
A main policy conclusion is that regulators should be more careful when incentivizing entry 
on markets with 3 or 4 active operators which is still one of the main policy issues nowadays, 
as one cannot mechanically expect a beneficial effect on prices. Naturally, our estimated 
results are only average effects, so one cannot discard the possibility that some entries of a 4th 
or 5th operator did have a price-decreasing effect in a country or two even where our 
estimates were not significant, but the overall European evidence between 2003 and 2010 
does not support the "n + 1 should be better" rule. We believe that the experience from this 
ex-post assessment is useful as similar questions arise with the ongoing spectrum auctions for 
4G services, so each regulator must carefully weigh the realistically expected benefits of 
additional entries when deciding on spectrum allocation rules. 
Concerning competition policy, these results provide evidence that the clearance decisions of 
competition authorities were justified on average in the case of 5-to-4 mergers, as no merger-
specific price-increasing effects were found concerning voice services. However, our results 
indicate that one should be more careful with 4-to-3 mergers as they bear a much higher risk 
of price increases on the long-run. Note that some merger investigations initially identified 
competitive concerns, but these were alleviated after remedies were offered by the parties. 
However, we cannot identify whether the remedies are responsible for the lack of price 
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increases or whether the mergers in their original forms would have had an at least neutral 
effect on voice competition. 
Let us finally note that the magnitude of the effects identified from our sample of events 
between 2003 and 2010 cannot be mechanically expected to hold for subsequent entries or 
mergers from now on. When assessing the impact of future entries in mergers one should 
more carefully evaluate the changes brought by the deployment of 4G technologies and the 
convergence between voice and data services. However, our study points out that one cannot 
mechanically assume similar beneficial effects for all types of entries and harmful or neutral 
effects for mergers, and not controlling for these differences might lead to misleading policy 
conclusions. 
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Appendix 1 : Summary statistics 
Table 12. Detailed summary statistics for variables used in analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
plow 195 14.89 7.209 4.170 39.47 
pmid 195 30.52 14.56 6.490 85.87 
phigh 195 51.50 26.51 7.820 158.9 
pav 195 32.30 15.66 6.160 94.76 
gdpcap 214 22,067 14,682 2,400 78,600 
pop 208 1.844e+07 2.315e+07 397,296 8.254e+07 
exchrate 216 0.761 0.586 0.00357 2.347 
infl 216 3.020 2.528 -1.700 15.30 
vat 208 19.48 2.521 15 25 
pen 197 109.8 21.67 51 170.6 
mtr 199 10.28 4.540 1.840 26.83 
mvno 216 0.560 0.498 0 1 
 
Table 13. Trends for yearly cross-section averages 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
plow_av 20.513 22.980 19.531 13.960 12.546 11.818 10.797 10.810 
pmid_av 41.900 48.828 40.906 29.178 25.336 24.299 22.202 19.610 
phigh_av 71.059 85.744 72.824 48.789 42.745 40.701 35.669 29.005 
Pav 44.491 52.517 44.421 30.643 26.876 25.606 22.889 19.808 
gdpcap 18900.000 19834.615 20848.148 22266.630 23874.074 24262.926 22685.148 23662.963 
pop 1.83e+07 1.84e+07 1.85e+07 1.86e+07 1.83e+07 1.84e+07 1.85e+07 1.86e+07 
exchrate 0.768 0.766 0.765 0.766 0.766 0.758 0.749 0.751 
infl 2.978 3.196 2.904 3.037 3.326 5.330 1.333 2.059 
vat 19.404 19.404 19.244 19.324 19.485 19.485 19.522 19.967 
mtr 17.067 14.355 12.578 11.115 9.874 8.275 7.035 5.458 
pen 84.067 89.533 99.548 107.392 114.037 120.481 123.333 125.719 
mvno 0.296 0.407 0.519 0.556 0.556 0.667 0.704 0.778 
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Appendix 2 : Estimation results on the level of variables 
Table 14. Results for regressing log of prices on the change in number of operators, 
estimation on levels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 logPlow  logPmid  logPhigh  logPav  
VARIABLES Coef se coef se coef se coef se 
         
deltaop 0.06 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) -0.01 (0.06) 0.02 (0.07) 
mvno -0.04 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.09 (0.07) 0.06 (0.06) 
logGDPcap -0.95** (0.41) -
1.19*** 
(0.35) -1.05*** (0.33) -
1.10*** 
(0.32) 
logPop 2.73 (2.02) 3.08 (1.86) 4.12* (2.03) 3.58* (1.81) 
logExch 1.20* (0.59) 1.71** (0.63) 1.67** (0.71) 1.56** (0.63) 
inflation -
1.74*** 
(0.56) -
1.50*** 
(0.36) -1.27*** (0.38) -
1.42*** 
(0.36) 
vat 0.04 (0.03) 0.06** (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) 0.04* (0.02) 
logPen -0.44 (0.35) -0.40 (0.40) -0.19 (0.42) -0.29 (0.39) 
logTerm -0.02 (0.10) 0.03 (0.11) -0.05 (0.11) -0.02 (0.10) 
Constant -27.07 (35.57) -30.02 (31.70) -47.90 (34.14) -38.95 (30.93) 
Country FE YES  YES  YES  YES  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  
Observations 195  195  195  195  
Within R-squared 0.75  0.78  0.80  0.81  
p-value for H0: 
error AR(1) 
0.00  0.01  0.00 
 
0.00 
 
Robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 15. Results for regressing log of prices on entry and merger treatments depending on 
the number of operators and the entrant's type, separated for 1st, 2nd and subsequent years,  
estimation on levels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 logPlow  logPmid  logPhigh  logPav  
VARIABLES coef se coef se coef se coef se 
         
e23big_1 0.01 (0.15) 0.04 (0.13) 0.09 (0.13) 0.06 (0.13) 
e23big_2 0.18 (0.15) 0.27** (0.10) 0.39*** (0.09) 0.33*** (0.10) 
e23big_3 0.01 (0.14) 0.08 (0.09) -0.04 (0.12) 0.01 (0.10) 
e34big_1 0.09 (0.16) 0.04 (0.07) 0.04 (0.06) 0.05 (0.08) 
e34big_2 -0.11 (0.28) -0.23 (0.17) -0.27 (0.16) -0.23 (0.18) 
e34big_3 -0.07 (0.14) -0.40*** (0.09) -0.49*** (0.09) -0.40*** (0.07) 
e45big_1 -0.59*** (0.06) -0.32*** (0.05) -0.28*** (0.05) -0.34*** (0.04) 
e45big_2 -0.45** (0.20) -0.22* (0.11) -0.11 (0.15) -0.20 (0.13) 
e45big_3 -0.08 (0.14) 0.51*** (0.11) 0.68*** (0.08) 0.50*** (0.08) 
e23sm_1 -0.14 (0.25) -0.29 (0.22) -0.32 (0.21) -0.28 (0.22) 
e23sm_2 0.16 (0.16) -0.11 (0.14) -0.17 (0.16) -0.09 (0.14) 
e23sm_3 0.21 (0.20) 0.03 (0.15) -0.00 (0.21) 0.04 (0.17) 
e34sm_1 -0.28*** (0.09) -0.32** (0.15) -0.32 (0.23) -0.31* (0.18) 
e34sm_2 -0.23 (0.21) -0.19 (0.13) -0.20 (0.14) -0.19 (0.13) 
e34sm_3 -0.22 (0.17) -0.03 (0.13) 0.01 (0.13) -0.02 (0.13) 
e45sm_1 0.27*** (0.06) -0.10 (0.07) -0.21** (0.08) -0.11 (0.07) 
m43_1 -0.34*** (0.06) -0.22** (0.10) 0.14 (0.13) -0.05 (0.10) 
m43_2 -0.34*** (0.07) -0.19** (0.09) 0.19 (0.12) -0.02 (0.09) 
m43_3 -0.30*** (0.08) 0.12 (0.11) 0.29* (0.14) 0.13 (0.11) 
m54_1 -0.04 (0.21) -0.15 (0.09) -0.18 (0.13) -0.14 (0.12) 
m54_2 -0.21 (0.24) -0.34 (0.26) -0.18 (0.16) -0.23 (0.20) 
m54_3 -0.20 (0.14) -0.50*** (0.10) -0.54*** (0.09) -0.46*** (0.08) 
mvno -0.04 (0.07) 0.09 (0.06) 0.12* (0.07) 0.08 (0.06) 
logGDPcap -0.81* (0.46) -1.07*** (0.33) -0.93*** (0.33) -0.99*** (0.32) 
logPop 3.72 (2.52) 5.89*** (1.87) 7.59*** (2.18) 6.46*** (1.98) 
logPen -0.55 (0.34) -0.47 (0.40) -0.37 (0.41) -0.42 (0.38) 
logExch 1.23* (0.69) 1.59** (0.62) 1.55** (0.69) 1.48** (0.63) 
inflation -2.17** (0.81) -1.74*** (0.47) -1.49*** (0.52) -1.67*** (0.50) 
logTerm -0.06 (0.11) -0.08 (0.09) -0.17* (0.10) -0.12 (0.09) 
vat 0.04 (0.03) 0.06** (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) 0.05* (0.03) 
Constant -43.14 (42.67) -75.28** (31.77) -103.33** (36.06) -85.06** (33.23) 
         
Country FE YES  YES  YES  YES  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  
Observations 195  195  195  195  
Within R-
squared 
0.80  0.85  0.86  0.87 
 
Number of 
country 
27  27  27  27 
 
H0: error term 
AR(1)  (p-
value) 
0.00  0.01  0.00 
 
0.00 
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Appendix 3 
Table 16. Comparing results on 3-to-4 entries by regressing log of prices on all treatments 
based on full sample and regressing prices on only 3-to-4 treatments on the subsample of 
countries starting with 3 operators, all estimates displayed 
 (1)  (2)  
 d_logPav  d_logPav  
VARIABLES Full sample se 3-operator subsample  se 
     
d_e23big_1 0.08 (0.10)   
d_e23big_2 0.28** (0.14)   
d_e23big_3 0.03 (0.17)   
d_e34big_1 0.02 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 
d_e34big_2 -0.20 (0.12) -0.21 (0.14) 
d_e34big_3 -0.21 (0.15) -0.22** (0.08) 
d_e45big_1 -0.31*** (0.05)   
d_e45big_2 -0.24*** (0.08)   
d_e45big_3 0.29 (0.29)   
d_e23sm_1 -0.33 (0.29)   
d_e23sm_2 -0.24 (0.32)   
d_e23sm_3 -0.15 (0.33)   
d_e34sm_1 -0.31** (0.13) -0.32*** (0.10) 
d_e34sm_2 -0.10 (0.16) -0.01 (0.19) 
d_e34sm_3 0.26 (0.19) 0.43* (0.21) 
d_e45sm_1 -0.22*** (0.07)   
d_m43_1 0.06 (0.12)   
d_m43_2 0.15 (0.13)   
d_m43_3 0.29** (0.15)   
d_m54_1 0.01 (0.05)   
d_m54_2 -0.06 (0.28)   
d_m54_3 -0.20 (0.30)   
d_mvno 0.12* (0.06) 0.08 (0.07) 
d_logGDPcap -0.00 (0.50) -0.75 (0.58) 
d_logPop 9.70*** (2.75) 11.29*** (3.67) 
d_logPen -0.46 (0.33) -0.41 (0.53) 
d_logExch 1.08 (0.75) 1.60* (0.91) 
d_inflation -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
d_logTerm -0.07 (0.11) 0.15 (0.17) 
d_vat -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) 
Constant -0.05 (0.06) -0.05 (0.06) 
     
Country FE NO  NO  
Year FE YES  YES  
Observations 168  95  
R-squared 0.41  0.47  
H0: error term AR(1)  (p-value) 0.77  0.66  
 
